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Oil and Gas-New Mexico Oil Conservation
Commission-Findings of Fact*
It has been established, as a general proposition, that the effect
of the "rule of capture" may be considerably weakened by a state's
efforts to prevent waste and protect correlative rights.' The specific
problem, however, often concerns the propriety of actions by the
state administrative agency responsible for carrying out the aim of
this general proposition. Section 65-3-14(a) of the New Mexico
statutes provides that the Oil Conservation Commission has the
duty to limit production of a given pool in such a manner as to
prevent waste, while affording
to the owner of each property in the pool the opportunity to produce
his just and equitable share of the . . . gas . . . in the pool, being
an amount,... so far as can be practicably obtained without waste,

substantially in the proportion that the quantity of the recoverable
gas . . . under such property bears to the total recoverable . . .
gas . .

.

in the pool ....

2

In attempting to fulfil this duty, the Oil Conservation Commission may establish proration formulae for lands where owners seek
to extract gas from the common pool. The power to set up a proration formula is to be distinguished from the power of proration
generally. Proration is based on a public interest concept, in that the
Commission determines the maximum amount of production allowable to each field.- The proration formula, however, is a determination of how each field's allowable production is to be divided among
* El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 76 N.M. 268, 414 P.2d
496 (1966).
1. Cases such as Jones v. Forest Oil Co., 194 Pa. 379, 44 A. 1074 (1900) to the
effect that if possession of the land is not necessarily possession of the oil and gas,
there is no reason why an oil and gas operator should not be permitted to make the
production of his wells as large as possible, were countered by a line of cases holding
that states have the power to regulate both the distribution and the production of oil
and gas. See e.g., New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U.S. 650 (1885) ;
Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900). See also Clyde, Problems of Regulatory
Agencies in Administering Conservation Statutes-With Particular Reference To
Well Spacing, 7 Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute 165, 170 (1962):
It now appears settled that provisions which bear a reasonable relationship
either to the conservation of natural resources or the adjustment of correlative
rights of the owners thereof was valid.
2. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-3-14(a) (Repl. 1960).
3. Comment, Amazon Pet. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n Nat. Res. 5 F. Supp. 633 (E.D.
Tex. 1934) ; see also 3 Natural Resources J. 178, 181 (1963).
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the individual owners of the field. 4 Although at least one major oil
and gas producing state has taken the opposite position,5 the New
Mexico Supreme Court decided in Continental Oil Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n 6 that the protection of correlative rights alone is
insufficient to give the Commission the necessary jurisdiction to
establish a proration formula. The court said that the Commission
has jurisdiction to protect correlative rights only after making preliminary findings of fact which "determine, insofar as practicable,
( 1 ) the amount of recoverable gas under each producer's tract; (2)
the total amount of recoverable gas in the pool; (3) the proportion
that (1) bears to (2); and (4) what portion of the arrived at
'7
proportion can be recovered without waste."
Any questions as to the court's willingness to apply this strict
standard were eliminated by the subsequent case of Sims v.
Mechem. 8 In that case, which involved a Commission order establishing two separate production units, the Commission made a general finding that "the most efficient and orderly development of the
subject-acreage can be accomplished by force pooling the NW/4 of
said Section 25 and the SW/4 of said Section 25 to form two standard
gas proration units in the Tubb Gas Pool ..
In rejecting the Commission's contention that this was equivalent
to a finding that the ordered pooling would prevent waste, the
court said:
There is nothing in evidence before the commission tending to support a finding of waste or the prevention of waste by pooling the
property into two standard units . . . since [the] Commission Order
• . . contains no finding . . . that pooling would prevent waste,

based on evidence to support such a finding, the commission was
without jurisdiction ....

10

The New Mexico Supreme Court's insistence in Continental and
Sims, that the Oil Conservation Commission make these four preliminary findings was regarded by some as absolutely destructive of
4. Id.
5. See R.R. Comm'n v. Sterling Oil and Ref. Co., 147 Tex. 547, 218 S.W.2d 415
(1949) for the proposition that a conservation commission can issue orders based solely
on the protection of correlative rights.
6. 70 N.M. 310, 373 P.2d 809 (1962).
7. Id. at 319, 373 P.2d at 815.
8. 72 N.M. 186, 382 P.2d 183 (1963).
9. Id. at 189, 382 P.2d at 185.
10. Id.
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the Commission's power to establish proration formulae. After the
general finding of Sims was rejected as insufficient, there was a possibility that the court would rule that the four Continental points
required that the Commission determine the exact quantitativeportion, in cubic feet of gas, of each producer's recoverable gas in place
in the ground which could be recovered or brought to the surface
without waste before the Commission could proceed to consider
various proration formulae that would protect correlative rights.
This would have presented the Commission with the duty to make
findings that were technically impossible to accomplish." The direct
result of the materialization of this possibility would have been to
render the Commission powerless to fulfill its duty under Section
65-3-14(a) to protect correlative rights in situations where a proration formula would make for more efficient development of a common pool. Moreover, in denying jurisdiction over these matters to
the Commission, the court would have inflicted upon itself the burden of deciding complicated engineering questions when the oil companies came into conflict over their correlative rights. By placing
the impossible task of making the above described preliminary findings, the court would have succeeded only in depriving itself of the
help of the Commission's expertise when a correlative rights question eventually came before it.
Thus, the problems of Continental and Sims reached beyond the
area of oil and gas law; the questions posed concerned the broader
principles of administrative law: how much power should the Commission have over what are technically "private" rights? How can
an admittedly non-expert court make sure that a body of experts
such as the Oil Conservation Commission is in fact making intelligent use of its expertise to the greatest extent possible? More
specifically, how can the courts look behind the Commission's various proration formulae and determine whether the complicated
figures and equations carry out the policy expressed by the New
Mexico statutes?
In El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n 2 the
New Mexico Supreme Court wrote an opinion that reveals a comprehensive understanding of both the nature of the administrative
process, and the technical complexities of the oil and gas industry. In
El Paso, the Oil Conservation Commission issued order # R-225911. Brief for Appellee, p. 23; El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n,
76 N.M. 268, 414 P.2d 496 (1966).
12. 76 N.M. 268, 414 P.2d 496 (1966).
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B 13 (amending order R-1670-C) which changed the proration
formula in the Basin-Dakota gas pool from a "25-75" formula
(25 % acreage plus 75 % acreage, times deliverability) to a "60-40"
formula. 4 The Commission made several findings of fact supported
by extensive testimony and other data. Three of the findings, # 11,
#13, and #14, are especially significant: In finding #11, the Commission defines each tract's A/R factor as:
the percentage of total pool allowable apportioned to each . . . tract

as compared to its percentage of total pool reserve . . .
A = % of total pool allowable
R= % of the total pool reserves
The A/R factor is substantially different from the ratio of each
tract's reserves to the total pool reserves, which are conceded by
appellants [El Paso Nat. Gas Co.] to be found in Column C of Exhibit A. That ratio could be expressed:
Tract reserves X 100 = % of total pool reserves and is obviously
Pool reserves
the denominator "R" of the A/R ratio above. The numerator "A"
equals the Percentage of total pool allowable attributed to each well
by application of a proration formula .... 15

The Commission was, in Finding #11, thinking of the last of the
four basic findings required by Continental when it said "More exactly, the A/R factor for each tract is a mathematical definition of
'what portion of the arrived at proportion can be recovered' from
that tract under that allocation formula. Thus, Column J of Exhibit
A which sets forth the A/R factor for each well under the 60-40
allocation formula is a precise and complete fulfilment by the Commission of the . . . fourth finding demanded by Continental."'6
Finding #13 was that under the 25-75 formula, correlative rights
were not being protected and that, correlative rights being a necessary adjunct to the prevention of waste, waste would result unless
the Commission could act to protect correlative rights. 17 Finding
# 14 was that the production of the portion of the total pool allowable allocated to each tract under the 60-40 formula would "more
adequately . . . prevent waste."'"
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Commission Order No. R-2259-B (1965).
Id.
Brief for Appellee, p. 3.
Id.
Brief for Appellee, p. 10.
Id. at 10.
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The El Paso Natural Gas Company contended that these three
findings were not sufficient to establish the Commission's jurisdiction
according to the Continental criteria."9 It claimed that finding #14,
to the effect that the 60-40 proration formula would prevent waste,
is not equivalent to a finding of "what portion of the arrived at
proportion can be recovered without waste. ' 20 Thus, the Gas Company argued that the Commission, in order to establish its jurisdiction, must make the "impossible" preliminary finding 2' of the exact
quantitative portion (in cubic feet of gas) of each producer's recoverable gas in place which can be recovered without waste. The
district court found in favor of the Commission. On appeal to the
New Mexico Supreme Court, held, affirmed.22 (This was the Commission's first substantive victory in the high court. 3 )
The importance of El Paso in the oil and gas area cannot be questioned. For those who saw Continental and Sims as destructive of
the Commission's power to establish proration formulae, it is a welcome affirmation of the Commission's rightful function as an arbiter
in the complicated disputes involving oil and gas companies. It is
now clear that cases such as State v. Mechem,2 4 will not be used to
remove the Commission's power to rule over technically "private
rights." The Continental rule has been interpreted in favor of having experts decide controversies demanding expertise rather than
going to a non-expert court for a fortuitous decision.
The El Paso decision is perhaps even more significant in the area
of administrative law and the New Mexico court's conception of the
19. El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 76 N.M. 268, 414 P.2d
496 (1966).
20. Id. at 271, 414 P.2d at 498; the gas company was trying to persuade the court
to apply the Continental requirements literally. Fortunately, the court reviewed Continental and the conservation statutes to arrive at a reasonable combined effect of
strictly controlling, but not destroying, the power of the Commission.
21. See p. 5 supra; the showing, by the Commission, that a strict interpretation of
Continental would render the Commission powerless to act concerning correlative
rights may have been the single most important element in determining the outcome
of the case. The strictness of the Continental standard itself, however, can be regarded as an "overaction" (on the Court's part) to the failure of the Commission to
make its best effort to determine those facts logically necessary to sustain a proration
formula order.
22. El Paso Natural Gas Company v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 76 N.M. 268, 414
P.2d 496 (1966).
23. Pubco Petroleum Corp. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 75 N.M. 36, 399 P.2d 932
(1965).
24. 63 N.M. 250, 316 P.2d 1069 (1957). This case involved the validity of the
workman's compensation statute under the N.M. Constitution. The court held that agencies were not to decide cases dealing with individual's rights.
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administrative process. El Paso's requirement of exhaustive findings
by the Commission is "the other side of the coin." That is, in its insistence that the Commission make more fundamental findings than
those presented in either Continental2 5 or Sims,26 the court was
forced to make the difficult decision of how much to insist upon without (a) destroying the Commission's utility, or (b) allowing it unbridled power to prorate gas between private organizations. With
regard to this problem, Professor Davis has said that:
Judicial decisions on inadequacy of administrative findings are . . .
one of the principal tools by which courts impose their limited control of administrative development of law and policy. 27
The New Mexico court, after reviewing the exhaustive findings
made by the Commission, said in effect that the Commission had
done enough, had studied the controversy carefully enough, had
done its job.
Although couched in the technical language of oil and gas law,
the decision was based upon the court's examination of what the
Commission had done and an intelligent appreciation that this was
all that should be required of the Commission. Thus, the court was
aware that expertise alone is not a sufficient basis for an administrative order; it realized that the duty of the court is to make sure
that the experts are doing all that they can possibly do before arriv25. The findings actually presented by the Commission in Continental were:
(5) That the applicant has proved that there is a general correlation between
the deliverabilities of the gas wells in the Jalmat Gas Pool and the [recoverable] gas in place under the tracts dedicated to said wells, and that the
inclusion of a deliverability factor in the proration formula for the Jalmut
Gas Pool would therefore result in a more equitable allocation of the gas production in said pool than under the present gas proration formula.
(6) That the inclusion of a deliverability factor in the proration formula for
the Jalmat Gas Pool will result in the production of a greater percentage of
the pool allowable, and that it will more nearly enable the various gas
producers . . . to meet the market demand for gas for said pool.
The court said
We have not overlooked ... Finding No. 3 which is the only one mentioning
"waste" but this particular finding . . . did not apply to the method of computing allowables.
70 N.M. at 318, 373 P.2d at 814.
26. See p. 4 supra.
27. 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law 436 (1958).
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ing at a ruling. 28 Yet the court stopped short of insisting upon a
finding that would be practically impossible for the Commission to
reach, realizing that:
Sometimes the reason for tolerating a gap between evidence and
findings or between findings and decision has to do with limitations of
human intellects or limitations on the magnitude of investigations
that may be conducted in particular circumstances. Not all propositions of fact that are useful and used in the Administrative process
29
are susceptible of proof with evidence.

The New Mexico Supreme Court said that the Commission must
determine:
the portion which the gas underlying each tract bears to the total
recoverable gas in the pool which can be produced with the least
waste. . . .We think the Commission made that determination in
this instance. 30
The validity of this latter statement is questionable. The Commission made exhaustive investigations and arrived at the finding said
by the court to be sufficient, but did it in fact make this determination? It probably came very close, but an absolute statement that
such and such a formula will produce the recoverable gas without
waste (or with the least waste, as the court interpreted the Continental phrase "without waste" 3 1 ) is not likely to be reached before actually seeing how the formula works in practice.3 2 This is not a weakness of the court's decision, however, but is its strength. By rejecting
the Commission's counter argument that even though it did make
28. For an articulate protest against an overly lenient policy toward administrative agencies, see dissent of Douglas, J. in New York v. United States, 342 U.S. 882,
884 (1951).
Unless we make the requirements for administrative action strict and demanding, expertise, the strength of modern government, can become a monster
which rules with no practical limits on its discretion. (emphasis added).
29. 2 K. Davis, supra note 27, at 475.
30. El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 76 N.M. 268, 272, 414
P.2d 496, 499 (1966).

31. Id. at 270, 414 P.2d at 497.
32. See note 33 infra.
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the required determination, such a determination was unnecessary,13
the court was attempting to tell the Commission that it must be
diligent, it must work hard at its job, and it must grapple with some
very difficult problems before the court will "O.K." its orders. In
continuing its demand for findings supported by the best evidence
possible, the New Mexico Supreme Court thus not only prevents any
arbitrary action by the Commission, but retains its rightful position
as the high judicial body: the coordinator of administrative rulings
and the guardian of basic concepts of the law in a legal community
where more and more preliminary legal decisions are being made
by boards of experts instead of judges.
THEODORE PARNALLt

33. Brief for Appellee, pp. 16-20.
The Commission argued that neither Continental nor N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 65-3-29 (h)
and 65-3-14 (a) required it to determine exactly "that portion of the recoverable gas
underlying each producer's tract which can be recovered without waste before it can act
to protect correlative rights." This was a separate line of argument which might have
endangered the Commission's other line which was that it had in fact made all necessary findings. The court did not accept the Commission's point that the findings were
unnecessary and held that the findings were actually made. The Commission may thus
be said to have "lost" the case in the sense that future orders can be issued only after
difficult surveys and tests have been diligently carried out; El Paso did not remove the
judicial "sword" that continues to hang over the Commission's head.
t Member, Board of Editors, Natural Resources Journal, 1966-1967; Professor of
Law, University of Liberia, Monrovia.

